Abstract. This paper estimates the degree of altruism among spouses by examining how often the driver of a car sacrifices his or her own self in a car crash in order to save a spouse. Holding constant the magnitude of a collision, a driver can maneuver the car to distribute the risk from collision between the driver and a passenger. We quantify spousal altruism by the degree to which drivers riding with their spouse redistribute the risk from a fatal accident to themselvesas measured by ex post mortality -as compared to drivers not traveling with their spouse. We find that drivers with their spouses are roughly 1.21 times more likely to sacrifice themselves. Assuming a $10 million value of life, this implies a willingness to accept a $2,100,000 loss to avoid the death of a spouse.
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The first challenge for this project is to control for the allocative effect of evasive maneuvers. We do this by using the accident data from the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration's Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) and focusing on cars with two front seat occupants, one of whom died. This restriction is intended to control for the magnitude of risk the driver may distribute. The assumption is that the driver has rational expectations about the magnitude of the impact and foresees that either he or his passenger will die and can choose who will bear that risk. (We ignore the cost of damage to the car.)
The second challenge is identifying married drivers riding with their spouses. FARS does not contain an indicator for whether car occupants were married and driving with their spouse. We have to employ a proxy for this relationship. We merged part of the Multiple Causes of Death (MCOD) dataset with the FARS data set to obtain an identifier for whether each fatal car accident victim was married. We define a driver to be riding with his or her spouse if
(1) the MCOD lists the decedent as married, (2) the driver and passenger are of opposite gender, and (3) the difference between male occupant's age and the female occupant's age is in the range [-2 years, 6 years]. According to the National Highway Transportation Survey (NHTS), the probability that spouses actually driving together meet these conditions is 0.8. We vary this age range and find that our results are quite robust to the specific age range chosen.
Our primary analysis estimates a logit regression in which the dependent variable is whether the driver died and the independent variables include our proxy for whether the driver was traveling with her spouse. We find that male drivers are strongly altruistic towards their spouses. They are nearly 1.21 times more likely to self-sacrifice than when not traveling with their spouse. We do not find any evidence that women are altruistic towards their spouses, though that could be due to a small sample of married female drivers. Assuming a $10 million value for life, we conclude that individuals are willing to accept roughly an $2,100,000 loss to avoid the death of their spouse.
In a broader economic context, this paper can be thought of as a field study in which the participants play a (deadly) dictator game. A driver-about-to-crash can be thought of as making a final offer to share aggregate mortality risks. As in the usual dictator game, the offer reflects preferences for fairness or altruism. In the spousal context, it is usually called altruism. There are two caveats to this characterization. One is that the driver can both pick the aggregate risk and how to distribute it. This is not problem if we can control for the size of the aggregate risk with proxies for the expected magnitude of impact. Another caveat is that the driver is assigning a loss rather than a gain. This only affects the reference point for the preference. Instead of a willingness to pay, it is a willingness to accept measure of altruism.
Section 1 surveys the literature on spousal altruism. Section 2 describes the data we employ. Section 3 offers a theoretical justification for our method of estimating spousal altruism. Section 4 reports our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Literature review
There is a considerable theoretical literature that is interested in the distribution of resources within families and that relies on intrafamilial altruism to draw conclusions about the efficiency of that distribution (Becker 1974 (Becker , 1991 Bernheim & Stark 1988; Bergstrom 1989). 3 Much of this literature is general in that it does not distinguish between the head of household's altruism towards a spouse and towards children. (So, for example, the rotten kid theorem (Becker 1981) could just as well be the rotten spouse theorem. 4 ) However, Becker (1974) and Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) note that, because altruism increases the return to marriage, one should expect to find altruism among spouses. There is also a theoretical literature that explores altruism between parents and children as an explanation for intergenerational transfers within families, starting with Barro's (1974) overlapping generations model (see also, e.g., Bergstrom 1986 ). Again, it is general and could apply to bequests to widows, though those may be smaller in size than or simply facilitate those to children. While there has developed a literature on bargaining within the family (in response to Becker's theory of the family), that bargaining literature does not rely on altruism, but rather on threat points within (Lundberg & Pollack 1993 , 1996 and outside the marriage (Manser & Brown 1980; McElroy & Horney 3 There is a larger literature on interdependent utility that applies to families, though does not confine its scope of application to families. See Bergstrom (1997) for a nice survey. 4 The main reason the rotten kid theorem sounds better is that spouses are thought to be symmetrically altruistic while parents of (especially teenage) children do not always feel their altruism is reciprocated.
1981). Finally, there are papers that examine the role altruism plays in mitigating incentive problems (Chami & Fischer 1996) or providing insurance (Nordblom 1997) . They frequently use spousal altruism as an example.
There is a moderately-sized empirical literature on spousal altruism. 5 It begins with a survey literature that measures the degree of good-will between spouses to predict which marriages will survive. The seminal paper is Buerckle and Badgley (1959) . In addition to the usual problems with surveys, the goal of this literature is not to survey and quantify altruism but correlate it with marital stability. More recent surveys include Konig and Zweifel (2004) (2) another person of the opposite gender. Each individual would then be exposed to a car crash where the aggregate mortality risk is held constant but the driver was able to distribute this mortality risk between him or herself and the passenger. The outcome would be the amount of risk the driver chose to bear himself. The treatment effect is the difference between (1) the risk borne by the driver when driving with his or her spouse and (2) the risk borne by the driver when driving with a random, opposite-sex partner. The average treatment effect is
where y d is the mortality risk borne by the driver, s d and s p are the sex of the driver and passenger, respectively, and d and p are the identity of the driver and front-right passenger, respectively. Fortunately for the subjects, we are not able to run this ideal experiment.
There are four ways in which our data and analysis differ from the ideal experiment:
1. We do not observe a random sample of opposite-sex driving companions. Instead we have a sample of companions that were in car accidents:
Moreover, FARS only includes cars involved in accidents with at least one fatality. We cannot avoid the non-randomness due to selection of companions into accidents, fatal or not. But to limit the effect of the fatality selection criterion of the FARS data, we only look at cars involved in accidents in which there was at least one fatality in some other car. This subset of cars is one that is more random a selection from all cars in accidents than is the entire FARS dataset.
2. We do not observe the same person driving once with his or her spouse and once with some other, similar person of the opposite gender. What we have is observations on people who choose to drive together. This is a hurdle we cannot overcome. Therefore, our comparisons of spouses and non-spouses includes the effect of spousal status and selection effects due to the non-random sorting of driving partners. The selection bias is
Assuming that the altruism towards chosen driving partners is greater than altruism towards randomly-selected driving partners, this suggests that our estimate of altruism will underestimate spousal altruism.
3. None of our data reports whether the driver and passenger are married to each other.
To proxy for this relationship, we construct an spousal indicator that is true if (1) the driver or front passenger is married according to the merged MCOD data set, (2) the driver and front passenger are of opposite sex, and (3) the difference between the age of the male and the age of the female occupant lies in the range [-2, 6 ] years. Thus, we label a male and female driving together as spouses if either is married and the female is no more than 2 years older than the male or the male is no more than 6 years older than the female.
Because the MCOD can only label a person as married if they died, there is a risk of false positives. 6 Suppose a married driver is rising with someone not his spouse. If the driver dies, we may label the couple as married because we know the driver is married and he is driving w someone of the opposite gender. (If the passenger dies, this will not happen because she is not married.) If we had data on whether the living occupant was married, we could reduce false positives somewhat by requiring both occupants to be married, but we do not have these data.
Instead we reduce the risk of false positives by imposing a restriction on the age range of the two occupants. The goal is to rule out false positives due, for instance, to fathers and daughters or mothers and sons riding together. To test how serious the problem of non-spouses accidentally being allocated to the treatment group really is, we calculated the fraction of married couples travelling together that meet our three criteria in the 1995 NHTS. We find, of actual spouses, 79.27 percent met our three criteria. This is an overestimate since the NHTS only samples households and many non-spouse driving companions tend not to be members of the same household. Therefore, we will vary the age range that is used to define spouses in order to determine whether our estimate of spousal altruism is sensitive to our proxy. We try to limit this selection by restricting our analysis to occupants older than 18 since that is the legal age for marriage in most states. But if married individuals tend to be more altruistic than non-married individuals, even towards chosen travel mates, then our estimate will tend to overestimate altruism. Ideally this would cancel out the selection effect from non-random assignment of non-spouse travelling companions, but we cannot be sure this is the case.
4. We do not know the precise amount of mortality risk the driver thought he was free to distribute in an accident. We only observe an ex post realization of mortality, which is a mix of allocative effects, distributive effects, and uncontrollable effects. We bridge the gap between the driver's expectations about distributable risk and ex post realization of mortality in three steps.
First, we assume the driver has rational expectations and rely on the law of large numbers. This implies that the driver's expectation of mortality risk is equal to the expected value of ex post realizations over a large number of accidents. 7 Second, we assume that the degree of control over the distribution of risks does not depend on spousal status. Third, we restrict our analysis to cars with two occupants and only one death. The fact of one death is intended to control for the magnitude of risk that the driver distributed between herself and the passenger. Specifically, we assume that in every car accident where only one out of two total occupants died, the driver expected that he had the same amount of mortality risk to distribute between himself and the passenger and that this amount was less than one. Ultimately, our empirical analysis consists of the following logit regression:
where i indexes cars; indicates whether the driver died; indicates whether the driver is male, married and driving with his spouse; indicates whether the driver is female, married and driving with her spouse; and are indicators for whether the driver-passenger combination is male-female or female-male, respectively; and X is vector of controls for characteristics of the driver and passenger (including other gender combinations, age, intoxication, and driving history), characteristics of the car, and characteristics of the accident (including whether the car rolled, the angle of collision, time of day, and location). The sample is confined to vehicles which (1) have two adult (older than 18) occupants seated in the front row, (2) were in a car accident in which one and only one occupant died, and (3) were in an accident where there was a death in at least one other car involved in the accident. The main estimates of treatment effects are
The former is the male driver's propensity to die when traveling with his wife minus a male driver's propensity to drive when 7 This is similar to the approach taken in Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) , who assume ex post realizations of mortality are a good proxy for ex ante expectations of health risks in the context of annuity purchases.
8 Moreover, the nature of the risk distributed is not cumulative but alternative. In other words, although the driver is choosing p 0 for himself and p 1 for the passenger, p 0 (p 1 ) is not the probability that the driver (passenger) dies, but rather the probability that the driver (passenger) dies instead of the passenger (driver).
traveling with some other woman. The latter is the female driver analogue. We calculate standard errors assuming clustering at groups defined by the interaction of spouse and gender of the driver.
Empirical analysis
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the control variables we include in our regressions. The first two data columns give the sample size and means for the whole sample.
The remaining columns calculate means for subsamples defined, first, by whether the driver was male (and passenger female) or the driver was female (and the passenger male) and, second, by whether the travelling companions were spouses or not. (Standard errors are reported below the means.) The purpose of calculating means for these subpopulations is to determine whether the sorting of driving companions into the spouse and non-spouse groups and the sorting of spouses and non-spouses into accident scenarios is really random. It is apparent that spouses tend to be younger, drive older cars, and be (surprisingly) less likely to use seat belts. In the case of male driver and female passenger (or MF) pairings, spouses are more likely to drive an SUV or other truck, use a passenger airbag, have rolled their car during an accident, and to be driving at night, and less likely to have a head-on or angled collision. With female driver-male passenger (or FM) pairings, spouses are also less likely to be at fault for an accident. These differences suggest significant non-random sorting that could affect the propensity of the driver (rather than the passenger) to die in a fatal crash. Fortunately we can control for the non-random sorting documented in Table 1 . The question is whether there are variables we do not observe that are non-randomly distributed and are correlated with spousal altruism in a manner that is not captured by variables we do observe. This is a weakness we have previously identified and that Table 1 does not resolve.
Our main regression results are reported in Table 2 . Specification (1) includes just the basic indicators for gender pairings and those pairings interacted with our spousal indicator.
Specification (2) pairings. It is apparent that a male driver traveling with a spouse is significantly more likely to die (instead of the passenger). Specifically, a male is 6 to 28 percent more likely to die when driving with his spouse, though our preferred estimate of male spousal altruism is 21.6 percent from specification (4), which has the most elaborate set of controls for non-random assignment.
We also find that a female driver traveling with her spouse is significant less likely -by at least 37 percent -to die (instead of the passenger). However, a simple tabulation of gender pairing and spousal status reveals that the estimates for specification (4) are identified off of only 48 married and 256 unmarried female drivers. In contrast, the same specification captures 857 married and 2,537 unmarried male drivers. Thus we are skeptical of our findings with respect to female drivers. Table 3 tests some alternative specifications of the model. In each case we keep the same controls as in specification (4) in Table 2 . Column (1) reproduces that specification from Table   2 for reference. Column (2) adds some extra control variables that were omitted from Table 2 because they have a lot of missing observations. These include the driver's accident history over the preceding year, the weight of the vehicle, and whether the vehicle had any defects that contributed to the accident. Column (3) omits accidents where the angle of collision was 90 or 270 degrees from head on. The rationale is that maneuvers at these angles are always to the benefit of both the driver and the passenger, that is, only affect allocative efficiency. Column (4) relaxes the condition that the regression include only vehicles in accidents where at least one person in another vehicle also died. The purpose of that restriction was to reduce the selection effect of the FARS sampling frame. (The relaxation of this condition greatly increases sample size.) Column (5) imposes a different structure on the error term for the regression. Specifically, it use a HAC estimator that allows the errors to be independent but unconditionally heteroskedastic. Column (6) includes more fixed effects to obtain an even more refined estimate of treatment effects. Recall that we define the treatment effect to be, for example, a male driving with his spouse -and thus married -compared to a male driving with a female -even if the male is not married. A more precise comparison would be between a married male with his spouse and a married male with a female non-spouse. To calculate this, we included dummies for, among other things, married males not driving with their spouses. Given our proxy for spouses, this just means married males driving with women not in the [-2, 6] range for male age minus female age. In other words, the sixth column reports an estimate of spousal altruism identified solely off of our age bracket restriction, rather than of both married status and that age bracket restriction. Finally, column (7) takes the opposite tack and defines spouses without reference to the age bracket restriction, that is, by reference only to marital status and the gender of the passenger.
The second panel of Table 3 gives our estimates of male and female spousal altruism.
The results are fairly consistent with Table 2 . Male spousal altruism ranges from 5.4 percent (column 6) to 44 percent (column 3). Only in the case where we try to identify altruism off of our age bracket restriction alone is our estimate not significant at 90 percent confidence level or better. Even in that case, our p-value at 0.12 is just marginally non-significant. Females appear to be more self-protective when driving with their spouse, though only the case where we relax our accident selection condition (column 4) is the population of married female drivers sufficiently high that we might give credence to our estimate (odds ratio of 0.803) of female antialtruism.
A natural question is whether our finding of male altruism is spurious. To address this, Table 4 reports a series of falsification tests of our analysis. Specifically, it examines accidents where one might suspect that drivers had less control over the distribution of mortality risks and asks whether males continue to appear altruistic in those accidents. If so, then one might suspect a spurious correlation. If male drivers appear less altruistic here, then the results in Tables 2 and   3 become more credible evidence of male altruism. Because the specific accidents Table 4 examines are uncommon in our data, we relax our restriction to accidents where at least one person in another vehicle died. (Thus our baseline becomes column 4 in Table 3 . The first column of Table 4 reproduces that result for reference.)
The second and third columns of Table 4 examine accidents where the road was wet and where the weather was bad, respectively. Our estimate of treatment effects suggest males are no longer altruistic towards their spouses. And in the case of wet roads, even females cease being selfish vis-à-vis their spouse. Column (4) examines accidents where the driver was intoxicated.
Our prior was that these drivers would be less capable of fine-tuned redistribution of risks.
However, we find greater spousal altruism among males (odds ratio of 1.79) and even some spousal altruism among females (odds ratio of 1.07). One possibility is that alcoholism leads to over-reaction or altered preferences. If so, this may not be a powerful falsification test. Column (5) examines accidents where the vehicle was hit from behind. Presumably the driver is less
likely to see such an accident and is less able therefore to maneuver in response to it. (Note that the sample size falls precipitously in these contexts because cars hit from behind rarely suffer fatalities and thus do not show up in our subsample of cars with at least one fatality.) As with bad weather we find males do not merely stop being altruistic, they actually become nonaltruistic.
The former is what we expected, the latter is surprising. Finally, column (6) examines accidents where the driver was going very fast, specifically, 70 miles per hour or higher. We find that male drivers remain altruistic -and female drivers self-protective -when with their spouses, though the odds ratios are closer to one. Overall, Table 4 provides moderate evidence that the males become less altruistic towards a spouse when they have less control. The only concern is that in some cases they become relatively self-protective.
Another question raised by our analysis is whether the results are sensitive to how we define spouses traveling together. Specifically, do our results persist when we change the agebracket that we use in our proxy? To address this, we first formulated our proxy using different ranges [n, m] of male age minus female age, where n varied from -10 to 0 and m from 0 to 15.
At the extremes, then, we allowed females to be up to 10 years older than their spouses and males to be 15 years older than their spouses. We then calculated coefficients on the spouse-MF and spouse-FM interaction under specification (4) from Table 2 using each of the different definitions of our proxy. The resulting coefficients are reproduced in Table 5 . The male results are in the first panel and the female results in the second panel. The third panel reports our estimate of the probability that a married couple actually driving together in the 1995 NHTS trip logs would have satisfied our definitions of the proxies for spouses traveling together.
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The first panel suggests that males are altruistic towards spouses for a large range of age brackets. Though the results are significant only in the range where women are just slightly older than men or men are moderately older than women, according to the third panel this 9 That NHTS only picks up trips within a household may cause bias upward bias in the level of these estimates.
Because trips with nonhousehold are probably all trips with non-spouses, this omission will not bias the slope of these estimates, that is, how much they change as the age ranges change.
accords with the ranges where the proxy is making the greatest gains in picking up spouses actually traveling together. The second panel of Table 6 suggests that woman are selfish in roughly the same range. Women do demonstrate altruism, only when they are the same age as men and when men are much older (12 or more years) than them. We do not have an explanation for this finding. Our general inference from Table 6 is that males are altruistic and females are likely not altruistic towards spouses.
So far we have confined our analysis to vehicles with two occupants and one death. The reason was that two occupant cars are much more common than cars with more occupants.
10 Nevertheless, Table 6 examines the case of three-and four-occupant cars. In order to hold constant expected mortality risk after allocative maneuvers, it retains the focus on vehicles with only one death and requires that that death be in the front row. Because spouses driving with a third or fourth passenger are likely to be driving with their children, we allow the back row passengers to be below 18. Finally, because there are few cars with three and four passengers, we employ the limited number of covariates in specification (2) -rather than specification (4) -of Table 2 . This will help augment our sample size. Moreover, we only calculate treatment effects for males because there are so few females in the model that they are often dropped by our statistical software (STATA) during estimation.
The question with three-occupant cars is whether the driver changes the distribution of mortality risk given the occupant in the back row. For example, if the (potentially) child passenger is in the back-left seat, the male driver faces a trade-off between his spouse in the front-right seat and his child behind him. Maneuvers to redistribute risk to himself may also endanger the child. Thus, we predict that the male driver will not appear to be altruistic towards his spouse when there is a back-left passenger. If there is a passenger in the back-right seat, however, the male driver may have an even greater incentive to sacrifice himself because bearing more risk saves not just his spouse but also his child. Thus, we predict stronger altruism with back-right passengers. In four-occupant cars, altruism towards the back-right and towards the back-left passengers probably cancel each other out. Thus, we predict drivers behave the same as in two-occupant cars.
10 One occupant cars are more common than any other.
The results confirm our predictions. Column (1) reproduces the results for two-occupant cars from Table 2 for reference. Column (2) looks at three-occupant cars, but includes an interaction between the spouse proxy and whether a passenger is in the back-right seat. The treatment effect is estimated by comparing spouses with a back-right passenger to male-female pairings regardless of location of the back-right passenger, that is, (male driver with spouse and back-right passenger) -(male driver with female passenger). Column (3) also looks at threeoccupant cars but changes the control group. It includes dummies for back-right passengers and for back-right passengers interacted with male-female pairings. This permits the control group to be male driver with female passenger and back-right passenger. The results only differ from column (2) if a driver without his spouse also cares about whether the passenger is in the backleft or back-right seat. Column (4) examines four-occupant cars with no dummies for the occupants of the back seats. Across the board males appear altruistic. A male with his spouse is at least 23 percent more likely to sacrifice himself than with a non-spouse. The altruism is stronger, as predicted, in three-occupant cars with passengers in the back right seat. There the additional rate of sacrifice is at least 48 percent. One should be careful not to interpret the threeoccupant car results as purely spousal altruism because preferences for children in the back row could be driving the results.
Conclusion
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